

Message Text

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ORIGIN MBFR-03

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ADP-00 PM-07 DODE-00 NSC-10 SS-15

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OSD/DPAE:COL.EINSTEIN

S/S:MR. PICKERING

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TO USMISSION NATO IMMEDIATE

INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

USDOCOSOUTH

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S E C R E T STATE 166471

E.O. 11652 GDS

TAGS:PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: BASIC CHARACTER OF ALLIED NEGOTIATING
POSITION

REFS: A. USNATO 3826, B. USNATO 3874, C. USNATO 3880

D. LONDON 9499

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1. WE APPRECIATE MISSION'S EFFECTIVE EFFORTS IN MAIN-
TAINING ALLIED FOCUS AND MOMENTUM IN MANDATE DEVELOPMENT.
YOU MAY AGREE TO KASTL'S PROPOSED ORGANIZATION OF SPC
PAPER AND INFORM COMMITTEE THAT US INTENDS TABLING PRO-

POSALS ON PART III IN NEAR FUTURE. WE EXPECT THESE VIEWS ON STRATEGY WILL HELP DISPEL FEARS MANY ALLIES EVIDENTLY STILL HAVE CONCERNING US INTENTIONS RE TABLING OF FRAMEWORK PROPOSAL.

2. THE FOLLOWING IS GENERAL GUIDANCE WHICH MISSION MAY DRAW ON IN FURTHER DISCUSSIONS. WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE USEFUL IN LIGHT OF LONDON 9499, FOR THE SAME POINTS TO BE MADE TO FCO AT EARLIEST CONVENIENT MOMENT.

3. WE AGREE THAT DISCUSSION OF ALLIED NEGOTIATING POSTURE HAS BEEN LARGELY SEMANTIC AND THAT AN APPROPRIATE DESIGNATION AS SUGGESTED BY KASTL IS "ALLIED POSITION." IF SUBJECT IS AGAIN RAISED, FOLLOWING POINTS MAY BE USEFUL:

A. SINCE WHAT IS INVOLVED IS A NEGOTIATION OVER IMPORTANT SUBJECT MATTER WHICH WILL BE TOUGHLY CONTESTED BY BOTH SIDES, NO ONE CAN NOW PREDICT A SPECIFIC OUTCOME. THEREFORE, AS STATED IN JULY 27 US PAPER, WE ARE NOT TRYING TO PREDICT EXACT OUTCOME OF NEGOTIATIONS OR OBTAIN ALLIED AGREEMENT ON SUCH A PREDICTION.

B. INSTEAD WE ARE INDEED ATTEMPTING TO CONTRIBUTE TO FORMULATION OF AGREED ALLIED NEGOTIATING OBJECTIVES, AIMS OR GOALS. TAKEN COLLECTIVELY, SUCH AIMS CAN PROPERLY BE DESCRIBED AS THE "ALLIED POSITION."

C. THE US CONSIDERS THE PROPOSALS CONTAINED IN THE US PAPER OF JULY 27 TO BE REALISTIC NEGOTIATING AIMS, WHICH, IF AGREED, THE ALLIES SHOULD MAKE A DETERMINED EFFORT IN THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS TO ACHIEVE, IF THEY ACCEPT THEM AS THEIR OWN.

5. SOME ALLIED CONCERNS, ESPECIALLY THOSE OF UK, APPEAR TO BE LESS DIRECTED EITHER TO THE CHARACTER OR TO THE CHANCES OF SUCCESS OF THE US NEGOTIATING PACKAGE THAN TO
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THE POSSIBILITY THAT US MIGHT DECIDE DURING NEGOTIATIONS TO INCREASE ITS REDUCTIONS IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE DESIRED SOVIET REDUCTION. ON THIS ISSUE, THE ANSWER CAN BE GIVEN THAT, IN PARTICIPATING IN THE EFFORT TO ACHIEVE AGREED ALLIANCE NEGOTIATING AIMS, THE US WILL OF COURSE REMAIN WITHIN THE OVERALL POSITION AGREED AMONG THE ALLIES. SECTION I OF THE PROJECTED ALLIED DOCUMENT WILL CONTAIN GUIDELINES DEFINING IN A GENERAL WAY THE REDUCTIONS ACCEPTABLE TO THE ALLIES. IN THE EVENT OF ALLIANCE ACCEPTANCE OF US NEGOTIATING APPROACH AS SET FORTH IN US PAPER OF JULY 27, THIS WOULD BECOME SECTION II OF THE ALLIED PAPER COVERING ALLIANCE POSITION, AND THE US WOULD ALSO ABIDE BY THE OUTER LIMITS OF US AND ALLIED REDUCTIONS SET FORTH IN THAT PAPER.

5. WE WOULD OPPOSE ADDITION OF "BARGAINING FAT" TO THE US FRAMEWORK PROPOSAL. THIS TOO IS A QUESTION OF TACTICS WHICH SHOULD BE DEALT WITH IN THE STRATEGY SECTION OF THE PAPER. WHATEVER PROPOSAL IS ADOPTED BY THE ALLIES, THAT PROPOSAL SHOULD BE A REALISTIC INSTRUMENT FOR USE BOTH IN NEGOTIATING WITH THE EAST AND IN MAINTAINING PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE ALLIED POSITION. UNREALISTIC PROPOSALS COULD NOT BE LONG SUSTAINED IN EITHER CONTEXT. WE BELIEVE IT IS OF CARDINAL IMPORTANCE, THEREFORE, THAT WE ENTER THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH REALISTIC AND FIRM NEGOTIATING AIMS. GIVEN THE OVERALL CIRCUMSTANCES OF NEGOTIATIONS (NEED TO GAIN PUBLIC SUPPORT, PROBLEM OF PRESS LEAKS, NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS INVOLVED, ETC.), OUR MAIN RELIANCE IN PURSUING THESE AIMS WILL HAVE TO BE ON DETERMINATION AND PERTINACITY RATHER THAN A STRATEGY OF SUDDEN TACTICAL SHIFTS ACCORDING TO A PRE-ARRANGED CONFIDENTIAL PLAN.

6. WE OPPOSE THE UK CONCEPT THAT NATO SHOULD ADOPT A RANGE OF PROPOSALS AND TRY THEM OUT EXPERIMENTALLY WITH THE SOVIETS. THIS IS ONCE AGAIN A TACTICAL POINT, BUT WITH OVERTONES WHICH MAKE IT DESIRABLE TO COMMENT ON IT NOW. ALLIED GOVERNMENTS WILL NEED A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING ON ALLIED NEGOTIATING AIMS BEFORE THE NEGOTIATIONS BEGIN. TO LEAVE OPEN THIS QUESTION WOULD CAUSE CONTINUING DIVISIVE UNCERTAINTY AND CONTROVERSY WITHIN THE ALLIANCE

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THROUGHOUT THE NEGOTIATIONS. FURTHERMORE, EVEN IF IT WERE POSSIBLE IN A MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATION WITH AS MANY WESTERN PARTICIPANTS AS THE PRESENT ONE TO FOLLOW A MORE TACTICAL APPROACH, WE BELIEVE THAT TO ADVANCE SEVERAL ALTERNATIVES TO SOVIETS COULD CAUSE THEM TO DISCARD ONE AFTER THE OTHER AND TO PRESS FOR FURTHER ALLIED FALLBACKS.

7. NONETHELESS, WE RECOGNIZE THERE WILL BE SOME DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE NEGOTIATING AIMS AGREED WITHIN THE ALLIANCE AND WHAT IS SAID TO THE EAST IN THE OPENING PHASE OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS. THIS IS PROPERLY A QUESTION OF NEGOTIATING TACTICS WHICH SHOULD BE DEALT WITH IN SECTION III OF ALLIED PAPER. AS DESCRIBED IN PARAS 3-5 OF STATE 158062, WE WOULD INTEND THAT THIS DISTINCTION BE LARGELY A MATTER OF THE DEGREE OF DETAIL INVOLVED IN SUCCESSIVE ALLIED PRESENTATIONS OF THE PROPOSED FRAMEWORK APPROACH.

8. WE BELIEVE ALLIES SHOULD CONTINUE TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN GUIDELINE POSITIONS WHICH ARE PRIMARILY UNDERSTANDINGS INTENDED FOR INTERNAL USE AND NEGOTIATING PROPOSALS TO BE PUT FORWARD IN NEGOTIATIONS. BELGIAN REP HAS COMMENTED (PARA 3 REF A) THAT, IN ADVANCING COMMON CEILING CONCEPT TO WARSAW PACT, ALLIES SHOULD

MAKE CLEAR THAT OVERALL CUTS IN ALLIED FORCES COULD NOT EXCEED 10 PERCENT. DESPITE WILLOT'S DISCLAIMER, WE CONSIDER THIS A TACTICAL ISSUE BEST DEALT WITH LATER. WE SUPPORT INTERNAL ALLIED GUIDELINE THAT ALLIED REDUCTIONS SHOULD NOT GO BEYOND 10 PERCENT, AND HAVE ACCEPTED IT IN OUR PAPERS OF APRIL 30 AND JULY 27. WE WILL JOIN OTHER ALLIES IN MAINTAINING THIS LIMIT IN NEGOTIATIONS. BUT WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE, BOTH WITH REGARD TO ALLIED PUBLIC OPINION AND IN NEGOTIATING CONTEXT, FOR THE ALLIES TO TAKE INITIATIVE IN NEGOTIATIONS IN EFFECT TO INSIST THAT EAST ACCEPT REDUCTION LIMITS ALLIES HAVE IMPOSED ON THEMSELVES, LEST EAST SEEK TO APPLY THIS LIMIT TO THEIR OWN REDUCTIONS. A LIMIT BEYOND WHICH ONE DOES NOT INTEND TO GO IS NOT A TOPIC SUITABLE
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FOR POSITIVE EXPLOITATION IN NEGOTIATION. EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF THESE LIMITS WILL BECOME APPARENT TO EAST DURING FURTHER COURSE OF NEGOTIATIONS. SPECIFICALLY, OVERALL LIMIT OF REDUCTIONS ALLIES HAVE DECIDED TO ADHERE TO WILL EMERGE THROUGH GENERAL EXPOSITION IN A FRAMEWORK APPROACH OF COMMON CEILING CONCEPT (WHICH, AS NOTED IN STATE 161267 PARA 13, WE BELIEVE SHOULD BE ILLUSTRATED FOR SOVIETS WITH FIGURE OF 700,000 MEN). POINT AT WHICH THIS IS DONE SHOULD BE SUBJECT OF SECTION III ON STRATEGY.

9. WE CONSIDER DISCUSSION OF UK CONCEPT OF A "FLOOR" IN NATO REDUCTIONS IS AN INTERNAL MATTER FOR THE ALLIES. FYI. WE BELIEVE THE POINTS WE ARE MAKING IN THIS MESSAGE REGARDING LIMITS ON ALLIED REDUCTIONS MAY REASSURE UK AND OTHERS. YOU SHOULD DISCOURAGE ALLIES FROM FURTHER WORK ON "FLOOR" CONCEPT. END FYI.
ROGERS

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